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WHERE AMERICA ENDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
ORDER BEGINS: INTERPRETING THE JURISDICTIONAL
REACH OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IN LIGHT OF A
PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION
AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS
Andrew L. Strauss*

Despite all of the attention given to personal jurisdiction i n civil
cases by the United States Supreme Court, the Court has never articulated a discrete approach to international jurisdiction. Rather,
in cases with foreign plaintiffs or defendants such as Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining C O . , Insurance
~
Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,2 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,3 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court,4 the Court has approached international jurisdiction as a n
ad hoc appendage to its doctrine of domestic jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court, as well a s the legal community i n general, has assumed that the U.S. Constitution prescribes America's international jurisdictional reach as if it were prescribing domestic
jurisdiction among states within the United States. Thus, with minor variation,5 the Court applies the constitutionally-derived minimum contacts test to international cases.

* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A., Woodrow Wilson
School, Princeton University; J.D., New York University School of Law. I would like to extend my appreciation to my research assistants, Jeanine Clark and Margarita Platkov, for
their very helpful work on this Article. I also wish to acknowledge my friends a n d colleagues, Mary Brigid McManamon and Marty Kotler, for their very kind assistance on yet
another one of my articles.
1 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
2 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
3 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
4 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
5 See id. a t 115 (noting t h a t there may be special considerations involved in the exercise of
personal jurisdiction where issues of foreign policy are implicated).
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The moment is right for examining this assumption. As the topic
of this Symposium suggests, the United States and other countries
are now in the process of negotiating a Hague Convention which
will prescribe personal jurisdiction in international cases. If the
Constitution does, in fact, govern the international ambit of the
United States' jurisdiction in these cases, there is a potential for
conflict between the Constitution and the treaty. The existence of
such a potential conflict would lead t o the possibility that the
treaty, at least in part, would be held invalid by United States
courts.6 This could both damage U.S. relations with its treatymaking partners7 and undermine the treaty's purpose of promoting
a coordinated and coherent international jurisdictional system.
Such results would be particularly unfortunate at a time when the
legal demands of the global economy have amplified the advantages
of developing and maintaining a well-coordinated international jurisdictional system.8 These advantages are three-fold.
First, a mutually agreed-upon international jurisdictional system
is integral t o overcoming existing barriers to the satisfaction of foreign judgments-the major goal of the proposed Hague Convention.
Clearly, in a world where defendants' assets may not be in the jurisdiction rendering judgment, if judgments cannot be satisfied
across national borders, the efficacy of the international dispute
resolution system is greatly impaired. National courts have refused
t o execute foreign judgments in cases in which they consider the
foreign court t o have asserted its jurisdiction too broadly.9 There6 For a discussion of potential conflicts, see Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments Conventions
and Minimum Contacts, 6 1 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1164-73 (1998).
7 The other members of the Hague Conference, particularly t h e European membership,
have become quite frustrated with previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions weakening U.S.
adherence to Hague treaty regimes. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486
U.S. 694, 707-08 (1988) (holding that service of process on a n overseas defendant does not
have to be in accordance with the Hague Convention on overseas service of process); SociBtB
Nationale Industrielle ABrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987)
(holding t h a t the Hague Convention does not require resort to its procedures concerning discovery). See generally Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague
Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1298-1300 (1998) (giving voice to the
European frustrations).
8 See Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International
Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 423 (1995)
(concluding t h a t a n international jurisdictional system is necessary, given the "transnational
economic and social interaction that has accompanied the rise of the global economy").
9 For a discussion of national court refusal to recognize foreign court judgments deemed
too broad, see Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17
GA. J . INT'L & COMP.L. 1, 22-23 (1987); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J . COMP.L. 1, 13 (1988); see also BIN
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fore, the greater the uniformity of principles of jurisdiction that can
be agreed upon, the greater the range of cases about which the parties negotiating the proposed Hague Convention can reach agreement t o require states t o satisfy foreign judgments.
Second, a successfully functioning treaty regime would help reduce opportunities for forum shopping. If nations maintain the
ability t o determine their own jurisdictional realms autonomously
while simultaneously failing t o apply uniform choice of law rules,
the outcome of cases will depend upon plaintiffs finding the forum
that applies the most pro-plaintiff substantive law. This frustrates
the goal of legal predictability and continues an international system which does not have the ability t o coordinate which state's laws
should apply in a given situation. A treaty-based system of international jurisdictional rules, while unlikely t o eliminate the potential for forum shopping completely, would provide that it only occur
to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the intended functioning of an ordered international system.
Third, such a treaty could correct the discriminatory way in
which American citizens are subjected t o overly-broad assertions of
jurisdiction by European countries. These countries are already
parties t o a European jurisdiction and satisfaction of judgments
treaty regime,lo under which principles of jurisdiction are welldefined.11 The Convention, however, requires that parties enforce
judgments of other signatory states against domiciliaries of nonCHENG,GENERAL
PRINCIPLESOF LAWAS APPLIEDBY INTERNATIONAL
COURTSAND TRIBUNALS
259-61 (1987).
10 See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), as
amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter
Brussels Convention]. The parties to the Brussels Convention were the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and the original six Member Countries of the European Union. See id. a t tit. 11,
art. 3. The Brussels Convention was further modified by the Lugano Convention. See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) (entered into force J a n .
1, 1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention]. The Lugano Convention extended the basic obligations of the Brussels Convention to relations among Members of the European Union a s
well as those in the European Free Trade Association. For commentary on the significance
of both Conventions and the relationship between them, see Richard G. Fentiman, Jurisdiction, Discretion and the Brussels Convention, 26 CORNELLINT'L L.J. 59, 85-94 (1993)
(providing a broad discussion of the jurisdiction issue); Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of
Judgments in the European Community: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 559, 589-90 (1993) (explaining the operation of the Brussels
Convention's provisions on recognition of judgments).
11 See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, a t tit. 11; Lugano Convention, supra note 10, a t
tit. 11.
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party states like the United States even when those judgments result from domestic assertions of jurisdiction that are far broader
than the limitations prescribed as between treaty parties.l2 Specifically relevant are Articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code
which permit French courts t o assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals whenever a French national is either a plaintiff or defendant in a suit.13 Thus, if I, as an American domiciliary, am alleged
t o have committed a torti4 in the United States against a French
citizen, under the terms of the treaty, I could be sued in France.
Likewise, German law provides that if the defendant has any property in Germany, then German courts would have unlimited personal jurisdiction over the defendant.15 If I, therefore, happen t o
own a few shares of stock in German corporations,l6 German courts
could assert unlimited personal jurisdiction over me. Moreover,
British courts would be required to honor such a French or German
judgment against any British assets that I might have.
Finally, although rare, the present lack of a coordinated treaty
regime also allows for negative conflicts of jurisdiction where no
state has the authority or willingness t o assert jurisdiction over a
dispute.17 A treaty regime could coordinate jurisdictional responsi-

-

--

-

See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, a t tit. I11 (providing for discriminatory enforcement against non-party countries).
13 Article 14 states t h a t "[a] foreigner, even if not residing in France, may be cited before
French courts for the execution of obligations by him contracted in France with a Frenchman; he may be brought before the courts of France for obligations by him contracted in foreign countries towards Frenchmen." THE FRENCHCIVIL CODEart. 14 (John H. Crabb trans.,
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995). Article 15 further provides t h a t "[a] Frenchman may be
brought before a court of France for obligations by him contracted in a foreign country, even
with a foreigner." Id. a t art. 15.
14 The language of Article 14, see supra note 13, has been liberally interpreted to apply to
torts. See Judgment of Dec. 13, 1842 (Comp. Du Britannia v. Comp. Du Phenix), Cass. req.,
1843 [S. J u r . I1 14 (Fr.).
15 See $ 23 Nr. 3 ZPO (Zivilprozepordnung).
16 See Brian Pearce, The Comity Doctrine a s a Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A U . S . E.U. Comparison, 30 STAN.J . INT'LL. 525, 565 (1994) ("[Iln Germany and the countries influenced by the ZivilproceSordnung . . . unlimited judicial jurisdiction may be premised on
the presence of even trifling or intangible assets . . . ."); see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren,
Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and
Current Practice in the European Economic Community and the United States, 8 1 COLUM.L.
REV. 1044, 1049 (1981) (discussing the broad "any assets" basis for jurisdiction under the
German Code of Civil Procedure).
17 See Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, 232 RECUEILDES
COURS,[R.C.A.D.I.] 201, 204 (1992) (stating t h a t "[tlhe authority of each State to decide on
jurisdictional competence can and often will lead to positive a n d negative conflicts of jurisdiction"); see also H. Vern Clemons, Comment, The Ethos of the International Court o f Justice Is
Dependent Upon the Statutory Authority Attributed to Its Rhetoric: A Metadiscourse, 20
FORDHAM
INT'LL.J. 1479, 1500-01 (1997).
12

19981

Where America Ends and the International Order Begins

1241

bilities so that some forum would always be available t o hear any
legitimate dispute.
Because the advantages of participating in a coordinated jurisdictional system are significant, it would be unfortunate if the Constitution were t o be interpreted t o stand in the way of their realization. I do not believe that such an interpretation is required. My
thesis is that the Framers of the Constitution understood international jurisdiction between the nation-states of the world t o be allocated by the international order, and only meant the Constitution
t o prescribe domestic jurisdiction among the fifty states within the
United States and between those states and the federal system. I
have argued elsewhere that consistency with the paradigm of state
sovereignty (which provides the conceptual foundation for the international system), requires that the global order define the ambit
of nation-state jurisdiction.18 In this Article, I argue that this paradigmatic approach is specifically embodied in the United States
Constitution.
To set the stage, Part 1.A discusses the basic principles used by
American courts t o determine which law is applicable when domestic and international law are in conflict.lg With this background in
mind, Part 1.B turns t o the specific problem of how an American
court would resolve a conflict between a treaty governing international jurisdiction and U.S. law, particularly the Constitution.20
Part 1.B closes by explaining why constitutional provisions would
be considered supreme over provisions of a jurisdictional treaty.
The remainder of the Article explains that no such conflict should
be seen t o exist since the Constitution does not prescribe international jurisdiction. The foundation for this argument is laid out in
Part 1I.A where I identify the fundamental constitutional principles
for determining where U.S. constitutional law ends and international law begins.21 My claim is that these principles, derived from
the basic paradigm of state sovereignty, provide that domestic law
regulates private actors and the state's internal organs of administration, while international law regulates relations between nation-states. Part 1I.B applies these principles to jurisdiction.22 After briefly defining jurisdiction as being about the allocation of
1s
19

20
21

22

See generally Strauss, supra note 8, a t 373.
See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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authority between constituent units of an organizational system,
Part 1I.B broadly demonstrates that while the Constitution prescribes jurisdiction among the fifty states of the United States, it
defers to international law to prescribe jurisdiction among the nation-states of the world. Part 1II.A conducts a brief historical review of cases t o show that this was well understood during the "era
of territorial jurisdiction."23 Part 1II.B discusses the transition t o
the present era of contacts jurisdiction, and explains that contacts
jurisdiction has obscured the basic purpose of jurisdiction. As a result, people today erroneously assume that the constitution governs international jurisdiction.24 Contacts jurisdiction has come t o
be viewed as not about allocating authority among states, but about
protecting the rights of defendants from over-assertions of authority by the state, a subject that can easily be misconstrued as a matter for domestic regulation.25 The Article explains how contacts jurisdiction has appeared t o lose its jurisdictional function both
because it allows for states t o have overlapping jurisdictional
realms, and because the Supreme Court, in proclaiming the domestic doctrine of contacts jurisdiction, resorted t o a formulation which
denied that the doctrine affected the allocation of authority between
states.
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
I. RESOLVINGCONFLICTSBETWEEN

A. The Doctrine of Dualism
The usual starting point for resolving conflicts between domestic
legal doctrine and international treaty law is the doctrine of dualism as it has been adopted in the United States.26 Dualism posits
that domestic (or "municipal law," as it is often called) and international law are two completely separate systems of l a ~ . ~As
7 such,
each has its own law making, enforcement, and adjudication sys-

See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
26 See George Slyz, International Law in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J . INT'L L. & POL.6 5 ,
67 (1996) (discussing the doctrine of dualism).
27 See i d . (stating that "dualism regards international law and the internal law of states
as wholly separate legal systems").
23
24
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tems.28 American courts, as agents of the American system, are
limited t o applying American law. By long-standing authority,
however, "[ilnternational law is part of our law,"29 and when appropriate, it is incorporated into, or becomes a part of, American federal law.30 In fact, Article VI of the United States Constitution defines "treaties" along with the Constitution itself as the "supreme
Law of the Land."S1
As the equivalent of federal law, in the event of a conflict between
the requirements of a treaty and requirements imposed by other
federal, state, or constitutional edicts, treaty law is subject to the
same rules of precedence as federal legislation.32 It is supreme (for
most, if not all, purposes) t o state l a ~ . ~In3 relation t o federal legislation, it is subject t o the later-in-time rule, which holds that a
subsequently passed federal law takes precedence over an earlier
passed one.34 Finally, in the words of the Restatement, "provisions
of international agreements of the United States are subject t o the
Bill of Rights and other prohibitions, restrictions, and requirements

28 See i d . ("[Rlules of international law apply within a state only by virtue of their incorporation into the state's internal law. They are binding, in other words, as rules of internal
law and not international law.") (footnote omitted).
2.9 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
30 See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 111(1)(1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGNRELATIONS] (stating t h a t "[ilnternational law and international
agreements of the United States are law of the United States and supreme over t h e law of
the several States").
31 U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; a n d all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under t h e Authority of t h e
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every S t a t e
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
32 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (asserting the legal hierarchy of
treaty law a n d other international agreements over state law).
33 The application of international law in American courts, similar to federal law, may be
subject to any reservations of power that the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reserves exclusively for t h e states. See U.S. CONST.amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by i t to the States, a r e reserved to t h e States respectively, or to the people."). Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920), was, however, dismissive of Tenth Amendment limits on treaty
powers. The door, however, may not be entirely closed. See Jeffrey L. Friesen, Note, The
Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the
American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1422 (1994) (stating t h a t
"Missouri v. Holland . . . does Cnotl make the Tenth Amendment a nullity").
34 See RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGNRELATIONS,
supra note 30, 5 115. For further discussion
of the rule, see JORDAN
J. PAUST,INTERNATIONAL
LAWAS LAWOF THE UNITEDSTATES81-101
(1996).
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of the Constitution, and cannot be given effect in violation of
them."35

B. Personal Jurisdiction and Domestic Law
How does all of this relate to personal jurisdiction? Personal jurisdiction in the United States is understood narrowly as a question
of constitutional law. This suggests that our inquiry should be
limited t o an analysis of the relationship between the Constitution
and the proposed Hague Convention.s6 Jurisdiction in the final
sense is, however, a question of which forum ultimately hears a
dispute. Our discussion must therefore be expanded, a t least
briefly, t o include the relationship between the proposed convention
and the whole body of law which identifies the presiding forum.
American forums may at their discretion establish rules and procedures which allow them to decline t o exercise their constitutional
grant of jurisdiction.37 Some state forums within the United States
employ "long-arm" statutes which may serve t o limit cases that
state courts may hear.38 Federal district courts use the long-arm
statutes of the states in which they sit in diversity cases and in federal question cases where there are no specific federal long-arm
provisions.39 In addition, each state and the federal government
maintain additional rules of venue which direct cases to those
courts within the forum which are geographically most convenient.
Finally, the federal system and many states employ transfer doctrine40 as well as the doctrine of forum non c ~ n v e n i e n s . ~
These
~

35 RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS,
supra note 30, 5 111 cmt. A; see Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of
the Constitution over a treaty.") (footnote omitted).
36 See STEPHENC. YEAZELL,
CIVIL PROCEDURE
70 (4th ed. 1996) ("Because the federal
Constitution defines the lines of authority among the competing centers of power, courts look
to the Constitution for their basic framework in deciding issues of judicial jurisdiction. . . .
[Wlhat we now call personal jurisdiction [is] part of the Constitution.").
37 See JOSEPH
W. GLANNON,CML PROCEDURE:EXAMPLES
AND EXPLANATIONS
23-24 (2d
ed. 1992).
38 See i d . a t 24-28 (discussing the use of long-arm statutes by the states).
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k) (specifying the jurisdictional reach of federal courts); see also
MYRNAS . RAEDER,FEDERALPRETRIAL
PRACTICE
5 4-13(a), a t 110-11 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining
t h a t in the absence of a federal statute which provides otherwise, federal courts apply the
jurisdictional laws of the state in which the court sits).
4 0 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 5 1404.
4 1 See RAEDER,
supra note 39, a t 119-23 (discussing the doctrine of forum non conveniens); see also Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY.
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doctrines allow judges to transfer cases t o other courts within the
forum or dismiss the case so that it can be refiled in another forum
if it would be more convenient for the case to be heard elsewhere.42
Because the American dualist approach t o domestic incorporation
of international law views treaties as supreme t o earlier-in-time
federal law as well as most state law,43 the only question meriting
serious exploration is the possibility that an international jurisdictional treaty would be superseded by conflicting American constitutional principles of jurisdiction. Approached as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the question turns on understanding the
allocation of law making authority between the domestic and international orders reflected in the Constitution.
11. INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION

A. The Sovereignty Paradigm and the U . S . Constitution
Finding the answer t o the question of whether the Constitution is
meant t o prescribe international jurisdiction lies in understanding
the intellectual universe in which the architects of the Constitution
were operating. In this universe, the distribution of all global political power, including the extent t o which the authority of nationstates yields t o the authority of the international system, is derived
from the paradigm of state ~overeignty.~~
Under the classic formulation of the sovereignty paradigm, the state is the ultimate and
supreme political entity within its jurisdictional sphere.45 As such,
L.A. INT'L& COMP.L.J. 455, 460-76 (1994) (discussing the historical development of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the United States).
42 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (identifying and discussing
factors of convenience); see also J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chem. of Canada, Ltd., 331 F.
Supp. 1215, 1220-22 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (dismissing a n action by a n American corporation
against a Canadian corporation on forum non conveniens grounds).
43 See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between treaty
law a n d federal and state law).
44 For a comprehensive discussion of the history of sovereignty, see generally EDWIN
LAW(1920). For additional
DEWITT DICKINSON,
THE EQUALITYOF STATESIN INTERNATIONAL
discussion, see Strauss, supra note 8, a t 391-93 (discussing the history of the paradigm of
state sovereignty and indentifying specific ways in which the paradigm is qualified by mode r n developments).
45 The concept of sovereignty denotes jurisdictional control. For a discussion of the connection between sovereignty and jurisdiction, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries
on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV.L. REV. 15, 16-17 (1935). For a
discussion of the general principles of international jurisdiction, see 1 OPPENHEIM'SINTERNATIONALLAW § 169, a t 564 & n.1 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
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all private, non-state actors46 coming within a state's jurisdictional
sphere, as well as the state's own internal organs of administration,
are subject to the absolute exercise47 of that state's domestic
authority. What is left t o the international order under this paradigm is to govern relations between these sovereign political entities.48
Because state sovereignty despite certain qualifications49 continues to be the basic organizing principle of the international system,
most of us continue t o accept implicitly its basic allocation of responsibility between the domestic and international orders. Highway speed limits are decided domestically.50 Laws regulating the
rules of international armed conflict are the province of the international order. While rarely stated explicitly, the allocation of responsibility is implicit throughout the entire constitution. The
document's first three Articles establish the basic framework for internal self-governance. They do not attempt t o establish a regulatory structure for the world a t large.51 Article I establishes a legislative branch with powers vested in "a Congress of the United
States"52 to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of

1992), and Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of
the Supreme Court's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP.L. REV. 1209, 1211-13
(1994) (discussing the connection between sovereignty, territoriality, and jurisdiction).
46 Today, under the well-accepted restrictive form of foreign sovereign immunity, foreign
states that enter t h e jurisdictional realm of their fellow states (to engage in private commerce, for example) will often be subject to the domestic authority of local courts. See generally Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. Q Q 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f),
1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994); CHARLES
LEWIS,STATEAND DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY
(1980).
47 Modern developments qualify the absolute nature of this authority. See Strauss, supra
note 8, a t 393 & n.71 (noting limitations on the absolute authority of states to regulate the
conduct of private actors, particularly in the area of human rights).
48 Public international organizations, formally created by states, have in reality become
increasingly autonomous and today should probably also be themselves considered independent subjects of international governance. See i d . a t 393 & n.72.
49 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
50 The sovereignty paradigm does not distinguish as between levels of government within
the domestic order. Although a t times influenced by the federal government, the states
within the United States establish highway speed limits within their boundaries.
51 The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution identifies "[wle the People of the United States,"
a s those attempting to form, "a more perfect Union," (quite clearly between the states within
the United States), and that "this Constitution for the United States o f America" was
"ordain[ed] and establish[edI7'to "establish Justice [apparently within the American system],
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." U.S. CONST.pmbl.
(emphasis added).
52 Id. a t art. I , Q 1(emphasis added).
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the United States."53 Article I1 establishes the executive powers of
the United States,5* the office of President to be held only by a natural born citizen of the United States.55 Article I11 establishes the
"judicial Power of the United States,"56 which "extend[s] to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their Authority."57
As a framework for internal governance, the document functions to
allocate power among the fifty states of the Union and between
those fifty states and the federal government, not among the nation-states of the global community.58 For example, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of Article IV requires that "[flull Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State."59 Thus, the Constitution
establishes the deference in certain matters that the fifty states
within the Union owe to each other. Nowhere does the Constitution
purport to establish similar reciprocal obligations upon the nationstates of the world. Defining such reciprocal obligations between
the nation-states of the world, it is well-established, is the province
of international law.60 Likewise, it is clear, from the context of Article 111's identification of the limited subject matter jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and other federal courts to be established, that
Article I11 provides an alternative to the courts of the fifty states
53 Id. a t art. I, 5 8 (emphasis added). These are among the list of enumerated powers specifically identified in Section 8.
54 See i d . a t a r t . 11, § 1(vesting executive power in the President of the United States).
55 See i d . a t art. 11, 5 1, cl. 5 (outlining the eligibility requirements of citizenship, age, and
residency for the office of President).
56 Id. a t art. 111, 5 1(emphasis added) (providing for one Supreme Court and "such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish").
57 Id. a t art. 111, 9 2 (emphasis added).
58 See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U . PA. L. REV. 26, 45 (1953) (noting t h a t the Framers of the Constitution were
extremely well-schooled in international law, and describing the Constitution as a charter of
authority, allocating jurisdiction between the different branches of the distinct national and
state authorities in order to achieve, in part, the essential constitutional objective of paving a
"way to nationhood-'one
nation firmly hooped together' with respect to everything external") (citation omitted).
59 U.S. CONST.art. IV,5 1.
60 That the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applies only between individual states of the United States has never been in question. The satisfaction of judgments
between courts of different nation-states is determined in accordance with international
principles of comity. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 8 1 HARV.L. REV. 1601, 1607 (1968)
(discussing inherent differences between American and international practice). See generally
Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV.INT'L L.J. 1 (1991) (exploring meanings
a n d origins of comity in international law).
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within the United States, and is not intended t o allocate authority
between courts within the United States and those within foreign
c~untries.~~
The implied general distinction between an inner-realm under
the domain of the Constitution and an outer-realm under the domain of the international order surfaces in Article 11, Section 2,
which establishes the treaty-making power of the Executive and the
Senate.62 By providing a process for internal ratification of the external obligations undertaken by the United States, the Constitution manifests the Framers' understanding that the document is
meant t o establish a structural framework for American selfregulation, and that the country is only one of many participants in
a separate international law making system whose domain is relations among nation-states.
To the extent that the above analysis leaves any room for doubt
about whether the Constitution's Framers intended that American
constitutional law should be interpreted as requiring the United
States t o violate a jurisdiction treaty, canons of American legal construction require that such doubt be resolved in favor of consistency
with the treaty.63
-

-

-

--

--

-

- -

- -

According to Article 111, the judicial power of the national authority was to "be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts a s the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST.art. 111, § 1. Article 111, Section 2 enumerates specific areas
of subject matter jurisdiction for the exercise of national, as opposed to state, judicial power.
See id. a t art. 111, 5 2. Alexander Hamilton specifically addressed t h e way in which judicial
authority to resolve disputes with foreign implications should be allocated among American
courts:
The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for t h e conduct of its members . . . . So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners a r e parties involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in
which they are concerned to the national tribunals.
THE FEDERALISTNO. 80, a t 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
62 The President:
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with t h e Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST.art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
63 In a n often-cited opinion, Chief Justice Marshall wrote t h a t "an act of congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See
RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGNRELATIONS,
supra note 30, § 114 ("Where fairly possible, a United
States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with a n inter61
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All of this analysis merely makes explicit what is implied in undertaking t o draft a constitution for the United States: that the
Framers incorporated into the Constitution their understanding of
where America ends and the international order begins.

B. The Constitutionally Accepted Sovereignty Paradigm and
Personal Jurisdiction
How does this constitutionally reflected allocation of responsibility apply t o personal jurisdiction? An elemental understanding of
personal jurisdiction unencumbered by the highly particularized
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject64 reveals that
personal jurisdiction, like all jurisdiction, is about the allocation of
administrative authority between subunits of an organizational
system.65 The concept is so basic that without it, anything but
small-scale social organization would be impossible.66 There simply
would be no way t o determine which administrative subunits of an
organization have the responsibility for exercising authority in
which areas.67 Chaos would ensue.68
Consistent with the basic concept of jurisdiction, subunits cannot
self-define their own jurisdiction.69 Our own federal system makes
national agreement of the United States."); i d . $ 401 cmt. b (observing t h a t domestic law is
generally construed to avoid conflict with international law). While this rule generally applies to statutes, logically the Constitution should likewise be construed a s consistent with
international law, unless it also clearly indicates to the contrary.
64 See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's development of contacts jurisdiction).
6 5 A Dictionary of the Social Sciences explains:
The term jurisdiction denotes the sphere of authority exercised by a state, agency of t h e
state, international juridical or administrative organization, or a non-governmental association, over places, persons, or things. In international law it includes the general
authority recognized as belonging to a state or to a n international agency, and the particular authority recognized in national law a s belonging to a n agency of government or
to a statutory or voluntary non-governmental association.
A DICTIONARY
OF THE SOCIALSCIENCES360 (Julius Gould & William L. Kolb eds., 1964); see
Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U .
PA. L. REV. 781, 788 (1985) (stating that "personal jurisdiction represents a n allocation of
judicial power among different sovereign jurisdictions").
66 See Strauss, supra note 45, a t 1215 (discussing the impossibility of organizing global
social life without jurisdictional authority).
67 See i d . (describing the need to have jurisdiction in order to allocate regulatory responsibility among administrative units).
68 See i d . (concluding t h a t "there would be no way to accomplish effectively the intricate
and myriad tasks necessary for governing a modern complex society").
69 See 2 MAX WEBER,ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY:AN OUTLINEOF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY
957 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & Ephraim Fischoff e t al. trans., Univ. of California 1978) (1968) ("The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic
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this obvious. If Louisiana was charged with deciding its own jurisdiction, there would be no jurisdictional constraints on Louisiana.
In a hypothetical federal system of jurisdictional self-prescription,
Louisiana and every other state could exercise regulatory authority
in whatever area they pleased, and the fundamental organizational
purpose of jurisdiction would be defeated.
If self-prescription is inconsistent with the premise underlying
jurisdiction, then the allocation of jurisdictional responsibilities between the nation-states of the world must be left t o the international order. Under the constitutionally-reflected sovereignty paradigm, international jurisdiction cannot be a matter for domestic
regulation, but rather, as a question necessarily involving relations
between nation-states, it is a classic subject for prescription by the
international order. The Constitution, therefore, must intend itself
t o prescribe the jurisdictional responsibilities of the fifty states
within the United States and the federal government and leave the
allocation of jurisdiction among the nation-states of the world t o the
international order.
As I will now demonstrate, that the Constitution is not meant to
extend into the realm of prescribing international jurisdiction was
taken for granted during the era of territorial jurisdiction.

111. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY-ACCEPTED
SOVEREIGNTY
PARADIGM
TO INTERNATIONAL
CASES
A. Easy Application: The Era of Territorial Jurisdiction
During the era of territorial jurisdiction (predating the founding
of the United States and ending definitively in 1945),70 the courts,
--

structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well a s in large party organizations and
private enterprises. I t does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authorHANDBOOK
§ 1, a t 16-17, 4 1
ity is called 'private' or 'public."'); see also AMA MANAGEMENT
(Russell F. Moore ed., 1970) (emphasizing t h a t establishing a hierarchy of "authority, power,
decision making and administering" is essential to the achievement of organizational goals,
and asserting that, whether delegation of authority results in decentralized or centralized
formal structure, a central source for guidance and authority is required for organizational
coherence and to avoid organizational "chaos"); PETER F. DRUCKER,CONCEPTOF THE
CORPORATION
30-54 (1946) (maintaining t h a t central authority, which defines the delegation
of power and the corresponding role of constituent units in any centralized or decentralized
organizational structure, is vital to administrative efficiency and to long-term survival of a n
institution).
70 The Supreme Court formally brought a n end to the era of territorial jurisdiction when
it explicitly articulated the new minimum contacts standard for asserting personal jurisdic-
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and the legal community in general, assumed that the U.S. Constitution's role was not t o prescribe personal jurisdiction in international cases. Rather, in assuming that the limits of nation-state jurisdiction came from the international order, courts during this
period took for granted that our Constitution was not intended t o
upset the allocation of responsibility between the domestic and international orders implied by the sovereignty paradigm.
The hallmark of the territorial era was an understanding that
nation-states possessed absolute sovereignty over their territories
and conversely were excluded from exercising sovereign powers in
the territories of other nation-states.71 It followed that a nationstate only had personal jurisdiction over a defendant who was inside of its own territo~-y.72A state asserted this jurisdiction by
physically seizing or arresting the defendant.73 Eventually the system evolved t o allow symbolic seizure of the defendant through
service of process.74 That in this simple jurisdictional world the
Constitution was not intended t o claim authority t o prescribe
whether the United States could assert personal jurisdiction over
someone who was in another country was taken as obvious by the
legal community, which assumed implicitly the sovereignty paradigm's division of domestic from international responsibility.
So straightforward was the territorial formula and so clear was
its international function of allocating power among nation-states
-

-

-

--

- --

tion in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra P a r t
1II.B.1(discussing International Shoe and the minimum contacts standard). For a very good
discussion of territorial jurisdiction, see generally Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279 (1983).
71 See IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
LAW 108-09 (4th ed. 1990).
For a discussion which is somewhat more detailed than t h a t provided in this Article, see
Strauss, supra note 8, a t 394-95.
72 This understanding is reflected in the classic American decision which defined t h e territorial era, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U . S . 714 (1877), which stated:
[Nlo State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by
jurists, as a n elementary principle, t h a t the laws of one State have no operation outside
of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and t h a t no tribunal established by
it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property
to its decisions.
I d . a t 722 (citations omitted). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, J r . , A General Theory of StateCourt Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 258-62 (arguing t h a t the territorial concept of
jurisdiction never worked very well and was invented by Justice Joseph Story with little basis in precedent).
7 3 See International Shoe, 326 U . S . a t 316.
74 See i d . (observing t h a t the power to arrest by virtue of what was called a writ of capias
ad respondendum had "given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice").
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that no one would have assumed that it was a creation of our own
Constitution. In fact, quite the opposite was the case. Courts explicitly reported their understanding that the international order
governed jurisdiction between nation-states in their attempts t o derive an analogous system of jurisdiction for the parallel community
of states within the United States.
Pennoyer v. Neff,75 the 1877 case which, in many people's minds,
exemplifies the territorial era, provides the most famous such reference. In that case, the Court needed an authoritative basis to
justify its use of the territorial approach t o allocating judicial powers among the "sovereign" states of the American federation. The
Court found such a basis in the "well-established principles of public [international] law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent
[nation-]State over persons and property."76
Many other nineteenth-century cases also stand as evidence of
the implied presumption that the international order prescribes the
jurisdiction of nation-states. For example, in the 1828 case of Picquet v. Swan,77 the former Federal Circuit Court for the District of
Massachusetts proclaimed:
[tlhe courts of a state, however general may be their jurisdiction, are necessarily confined t o the territorial limits of
the state. Their process cannot be executed beyond those
limits; and any attempt t o act upon persons or things beyond
them, would be deemed an usurpation of foreign sovereignty,
not justified or acknowledged by the Law of nations.78
Likewise in 1848, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in holding that
Georgia could not assert personal jurisdiction over a resident of
South Carolina, reported its understanding that "the rule is firmly
fixed, that no sovereignty can extend its process beyond its territorial
Limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions.
This is the rule, by the laws of nations-by the Common Law, and
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. a t 722. Justice Field concludes:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many
of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except a s restrained and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these
principles is, t h a t every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.
Id.
77 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).
78 Id. a t 611 (emphasis added).
75

76
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[it] is recognized by t h e American Courts."79 Additionally, i n 1850
i n D'Arcy u. Ketchum,80 t h e Supreme Court itself, anticipating its
decision i n Pennoyer, made reference t o t h e international order's
prescription of international jurisdiction.81 Holding that an American state could refuse t o give effect t o a sister American state's
judgment on t h e basis of a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the Court
proclaimed that, "[wle deem it to be free from controversy that
these adjudications a r e i n conformity t o t h e well-established rules
of international law, regulating governments foreign t o each
other."s2 Many other cases of t h e e r a evidenced a similar understanding.83
With the rise of contacts jurisdiction, however, this simple territorial model of jurisdiction would lose its viability, a n d with it
Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 515 (1848).
52 U.S. (11How.) 165 (1850).
81 See i d . a t 174 (discussing the limits of nation-state jurisdiction a s established under t h e
rules of international law).
82 Id.
83 Other cases during the era of territorial jurisdiction also evidence t h e implied presumption t h a t the international order prescribes the jurisdiction of nation-states. See Wildenhus's
Case, 120 U.S. 1, 19 (1887) (citing a French case for the proposition t h a t "'every state has
sovereign jurisdiction throughout its territory"') (citation omitted); Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517, 589 (1839) (analogizing American states to nations for jurisdictional
purposes); Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (finding that a Massachusetts court had no jurisdiction over a resident of Connecticut); Peckham v. North Parish
in Haverhill, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 274, 286 (1834) (holding that corporations established under
a foreign state a r e beyond the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts); M'Queen v. Middletown
Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 4, 7 (N.Y. 1819) (holding that jurisdiction does not attach to a corporation
outside the sovereignty where t h a t corporation's body exists); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 261,
284 (Pa. 1788); Campbell v. Wilson, 6 Tex. 379, 391 (1851) (stating t h a t , from "'an international point of view, jurisdiction, to be rightfully exercised, must be founded on the person . . . or the thing being within the territory"') (citation omitted); see also Max Rheinstein,
The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.775, 782 n.23 (1955) (discussing
cases which address territorial limits on judicial power in reference to judgments); i d . a t 783
n.28 (discussing cases which address territorial limits on the state power to grant divorces);
id. a t 783 n.29 (discussing cases which address territorial limits on the state power to tax);
id. a t 783 n.30, 784 n.31 (discussing cases which address the state power to legislate).
Patrick Borchers, based upon his review of early personal jurisdiction cases, has concluded
that courts prior to Pennoyer consistently applied the international territorial principles of
personal jurisdiction. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVISL. REV.19,
25-32 (1990) (summarizing the relevant cases).
John Drobak, based upon his own research, has similarly concluded:
Under the principles of international law as understood by these American courts, one
country did not have authority aver the citizens of another unless they or their property
were within the borders of the country. The courts used this concept of governmental
territorial authority as the basis for rules of personal jurisdiction.
John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV.1015, 1022
(1983); see i d . a t 1019-25 (summarizing the relevant cases).
79

80

1254

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 61

would go the clarity of understanding that made the application of
international law to international cases appear so natural.
I will now turn t o explaining how courts and commentators came
t o misunderstand the nature of jurisdiction during the contacts era,
and how this misunderstanding led t o the assumption that domestic jurisdictional principles should be applied in international cases.

B. The Conundrum of Contacts Analysis
1. The Conversion t o Contacts
In 1945, the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washingtons4 brought the era of territorial jurisdiction t o an end.85 In that
case, which presented a question regarding the jurisdiction of a
state within the United States, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed what came t o be identified as the minimum contacts test.
The Court proclaimed that:
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant t o a judgment i n personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Commentators generally agree that economic developments
forced the Supreme Court t o make the transition from territoriality

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
When I speak of the end of the era of territorial jurisdiction it should not be taken to
mean t h a t territoriality a s the primary basis for jurisdiction ended in 1945, but only t h a t
personal jurisdiction was no longer strictly limited to the forum where the defendant was
territorially present. In fact, the analysis which follows relies on the prevailing assumption
underlying Supreme Court opinions that the Court does not have the independent power to
expand the basis for state jurisdiction beyond territoriality.
86 International Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has continued to refine the minimum
contacts doctrine in numerous cases. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990);
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985);Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984);Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982);World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978);Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977);Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
84

85
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t o contacts jurisdiction.S7 Most significant was the increasing number of corporate defendantsa8 which made reliance on the defendant's presence within the forum as the sine qua non for the exercise of state power no longer possible.89 As the facts in International
Shoe itself made clear,go while the corporation is metaphorically
deemed t o be a person, it is in reality a legal "fiction" composed of a
multitude of many different persons all performing different functions. The entity, therefore, has no physical presence, much less
one in a particular jurisdiction. Should the entity be deemed "to be"
where it was formally incorporated, where its board of directors sat,
where its owners (the shareholders) were, where its workers were,
or where its customers were? Without a satisfactory answer to
these questions, the courts were forced to change the basis for ju87 See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
257, 343-44 (1990) (discussing the factors t h a t lead to the demise of territorial jurisdiction).
88 I n 1932, in their very influential work of the day, THE MODERNCORPORATION
AND
PRIVATEPROPERTY,
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means wrote of the tremendous growth
in corporations:
Thus, in field after field, the corporation has entered, grown, and become wholly or partially dominant. The date of its appearance and the degree of its dominance have in
general varied with two factors, the public character of the activity in question a n d the
amount of fured capital necessary to carry on business. I t came first in t h e fields of
public utilities, common carriers, banks and insurance companies (which even i n the
1840's were conceded to perform public functions) and last i n the areas of personal
service and agriculture . . . On the basis of its development in t h e past we may look forward to a time when practically all economic activity will be carried on under the corpor a t e form.
ADOLFA. BERLE& GARDINERC. MEANS,THE MODERN
CORPORATION
AND PRIVATEPROPERTY
17 (rev. ed. 1982) (footnote omitted).
89 I n addition to the rise in corporate defendants, other social, economic, and technological
changes contributed to making the territorial approach to jurisdiction anachronistic. For
example, commentators frequently point to the rising popularity of automobiles. See i d .
Under the strict territorial approach to jurisdiction, drivers could commit a tort i n one state,
drive out of state before t h e victim could arrange for process to be served, and thereby shield
themselves from suit.
90 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 313-14. In International Shoe, the state of Washington attempted to assert jurisdiction over a corporation whose contact with t h a t state was
limited to the selling of its goods. See i d . In addressing the metaphysical problem of defining corporate presence t h e Court wrote:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon
a s though it were a fact, it is clear t h a t unlike a n individual its "presence" without, a s
well a s within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in
its behalf by those who a r e authorized to act for it. To say t h a t the corporation is so far
"present" there a s to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the
maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question t.o be decided. For the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process.
Id. a t 316-17 (citations omitted).
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risdiction. For many years before International Shoe, lower courts
had been moving away from a territorial approach toward a more
expansive view of jurisdiction.91 In International Shoe, literal presence within the forum was replaced by the notion t h a t under the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, certain contacts with
t h e forum justified jurisdiction.92
2. The Illusion that Contacts Jurisdiction Is Not About the
Allocation of Regulatory Authority

Today, a s evidenced by the question before this Symposium,
courts93 and commentatorsg4 operating within the new contacts
91 Before the development of minimum contacts, state assertions of jurisdiction over corporations were based on the fiction t h a t corporations had consented impliedly to the jurisdiction of every state where they conducted business. In Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855), and St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882), the Supreme Court held
t h a t a state could condition a corporation's right to do business within its borders on its consent to the personal jurisdiction of t h a t state. See Lafayette, 59 U.S. a t 407; S t . Clair, 106
U.S. a t 356. The Court attempted to use the concept of implied consent to get around the
limitations of territoriality in several other areas as well. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1927) (approving a state statute subjecting nonresident motorists to personal jurisdiction for in-state accidents based on a theory of implied consent). The obvious problem
with this approach is t h a t it was based on what Professor Ronald Dworkin calls "counterfactual consent," meaning that there is, in fact, no consent. Ronald Dworkin, Why Effzciency?: A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRAL. REV. 563, 575 (1980)
(demonstrating t h a t the argument t h a t "I would have consented had I been asked . . . provides no reason in itself for enforcing against me that to which I would have (but did not)
consent").
92 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 316. For a n excellent and detailed textbook examination of the U.S. minimum contacts doctrine as developed through subsequent case law, see
H. FIELDET AL.,CIVILPROCEDURE
923-1052 (7th ed. 1997).
RICHARD
93 Four Supreme Court cases have dealt with assertions of jurisdiction over foreign defendants. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952). Asahi presented a jurisdiction question where both parties were foreign. See Asahi, 480 U.S. a t 106. In all of these cases, t h e Court simply assumed t h a t the
U.S. domestic law of jurisdiction was applicable. Of course, the United States is not presently party to a jurisdictional treaty t h a t would be applicable, but the Court failed to consider the possibility t h a t other sources of international law-specifically custom-might
apply. Courts assumed t h a t the international law of jurisdiction applied to international
jurisdiction during the territorial era, despite their being no jurisdictional treaty. For a more
detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's failure to consider applying the international law
of jurisdiction to international cases, a s well as the existence of a possible jurisdictional role
for custom, see Strauss, supra note 8, a t 383-87,389.
94 Several commentators have argued t h a t in cases involving foreign defendants or federal assertions of jurisdiction, the United States as a whole, rather than a particular state
within it, should be considered the relevant sovereign with which a defendant must have
minimum contacts. These commentators have all assumed t h a t it is the U.S. Constitution
rather than international law that prescribes this jurisdiction. See generally, e.g., Born, su-
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framework no longer assume that the international order should
prescribe international jurisdiction. Rather, t o the contrary, they
assume that the Constitution prescribes the contacts that are necessary for assertions of jurisdiction. This is equally true whether
the assertion of jurisdiction is by one of the fifty states who collectively operate as constituent units of the American federation or
whether it is by the United States as a whole operating as a part of
the international order.
Where does this assumption come from? There are two common
underlying illusions about contacts jurisdiction. These illusions
give rise t o this assumption that international jurisdiction is no
longer about the international question of the allocation of authority between the constituent subunits of the international system.
First, the fact that contacts jurisdiction allows for nation-states t o
have overlapping jurisdictional realms obscures the fact that jurisdiction continues t o be about the allocation of authority. Under the
territorial scheme, because jurisdiction was mutually exclusiveassigned only to the one forum where the defendant was presentquite obviously a finite reserve of regulatory power was being allocated among states. But under contacts jurisdiction, defendants
potentially have requisite contacts with multiple forums, each of
which possess the simultaneous power t o exercise jurisdiction in a
given case. The existence of non-exclusive, overlapping jurisdiction
creates the impression that administrative power does not need t o
be allocated among nation-states. Jurisdiction, one might come t o
assume, must be about something other than the international allocation of administrative authority. Nevertheless, it is essential t o
remember that jurisdiction remains about what jurisdiction always
has been fundamentally about: the allocation of sovereign authority. Even overlapping and non-exclusive jurisdictional realms serve
t o distribute administrative authority.
At an even more fundamental level, contacts doctrine, as formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, denies that the Court, in authorizing states within the United States to exercise authority outside
their traditional territorial confines, was engineering a transforma-

--

-

pra note 9; Brian B. Frasch, National Contacts as a Basis for I n Personam Jurisdiction Over
Aliens i n Federal Question Suits, 70 CAL. L. REV. 686 (1982); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction i n the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U . L. REV. 1
(1984); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 6 9 VA. L. REV. 85
(1983); Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the
L. REV. 1(1988).
Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL.
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tion of state jurisdictional powers.95 Rather, under the Supreme
Court's formulation, state jurisdictional powers do not change. Instead, the state's ability t o assert jurisdiction extraterritorially is
premised upon the agreement of out-of-state defendants t o acquiesce to state powers.96 Because contacts jurisdiction under this
formulation is not about empowering the state to exercise new jurisdictional powers, contacts doctrine applied internationally brings
with it no new power to, in fact, be allocated by the international
order.
The Supreme Court adopted this formulation because it did not
appear t o believe that it could alter the basic territorial powers of
the state. The reasons for this probably lie in history and in psychology. The state, and especially the popular conception of it as a
territorially-defined sovereign entity, has not been just a political
convention of the modem world. Since the emergence of the nationstate after the Thirty Years War in 1648,97
humankind has been so
psychologically wedded t o the idea of the territorially sovereign
state as to have turned it into a kind of religious icon.98 The abso95 See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument a n d Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX.L. REV. 689, 696 (1987) (explaining that rather t h a n reworking t h e
Pennoyer-era conceptions of jurisdiction, the contacts doctrine just recognizes that "a sovereign may form a relationship with a n individual t h a t supplements t h e sovereign's internal
regulatory authority," thus justifying jurisdiction).
96 See Strauss, supra note 8, a t 399 (stating t h a t "[dloctrine-makers, however, believing
that the state's territorial jurisdictional character was immutable, rationalized contacts jurisdiction with the notion of consent") (footnote omitted).
97 This is the date most accepted for the development of the modern nation-state. For a
discussion of this development, see generally ARTHURNUSSBAUM,
A CONCISEHISTORYOF
THE LAWOF NATIONS(rev. ed. 1954).
98 The supernatural basis of the state is reflected in the concept of the divine right of
kings who were closely identified with the state itself. The writings of J e a n Bodin, who is
often considered the intellectual father of the modern nation-state, reflect this understanding:
Since there is nothing greater on earth, after God, than sovereign princes, and since
they have been established by Him as His lieutenants for commanding other men, we
need to be precise about their status (qualit&)so t h a t we may respect and revere their
majesty in complete obedience, and d&them honor in our thoughts and in our speech.
Contempt for one's sovereign prince is contempt toward God, of whom he is the earthy
image.
JEAN BODIN,ON SOVEREIGNTY
46 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans. 1992).
Starting in the latter part of the eighteenth century, international law generally took a
positivist t u r n away from theism, but intense devotion to the state a n d t h e concept of statehood still remains a dominant factor in international social life. Richard Falk has recently
written:
[Slovereignty and statehood remain a normative horizon for most peoples in the world,
especially for those who are victimized, and provides the outer limit for the most collective of rights, the self-determination of peoples. The persisting vitality of sovereignty a s
a normative ideal reflects the power of nationalism as the decisive basis of political
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lutist formulation of the state as an immutably defined territorial
entity is reflected in Chief Justice John Marshall's famous 1812
declaration in Schooner Exchange v. MYFaddon:99
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty t o the extent of the restriction,
and an investment of that sovereignty t o the same extent in
that power which could impose such restriction.loO
With the arrival of the contacts era, the Justices of the Supreme
Court, operating as the high priests of this secular religious tradition, seem t o have simply assumed that it was beyond their power
t o alter the fundamental territorial character of the fifty
"sovereign" united states.101 Instead of simply expanding the powers of these states to allow for contacts jurisdiction, they evidently
felt it necessary to invent a formulation which only allowed the
states to assert jurisdiction if "there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro-

community. This power is expressed through patriotic fervor, ranging from victory in
sports organized as competition among countries, to participation in war for the defense
of the homeland. Sovereignty embodies the moral, legal, and political claims of nationalism a t the state level, establishing its strong symbolic and substantive presence in
world order thought and practice, while providing the decisive link between "self' a n d
"other" in international political life.
RICHARDFALK,ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE:TOWARDA NEW GLOBALPOLITICS80 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
99 11U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
100 Id. a t 136.
101 The basic formulation in International Shoe and its progeny assumes that the state
has the intrinsic power to exercise territorial jurisdiction, but t h a t only through conceptual
machinations which do not alter the basic territorial character of the state can nonterritorial assertions of jurisdiction be justified.
Specifically, these cases do not redefine straightforwardly the basic territorial character of
the state by proclaiming simply a new jurisdictional entity with altered powers. Rather, in
assuming the state's intrinsic territorial character, jurisdiction is justified as "fair" if the defendant h a s "contacts, ties, or relations" to t h a t predefined territorial entity. International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). See generally Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA.L. REV. 293, 308 (1987) (supporting the
notion t h a t territorial powers simply are assumed). While the Supreme Court's conceptualization of the rationale for contacts jurisdiction has not been completely consistent, see infra
notes 102, 110, the basic assumption t h a t the state is intrinsically territorial h a s not
changed.

Albany Law Review

tections of its laws."102 Thus, the state could remain exclusively
territorial and yet exercise jurisdiction over defendants who had in
some way independently acquiesced to its power.103 The Supreme
Court, in endorsing this new jurisdiction, was, despite the pretense
of maintaining territoriality, altering fundamentally the nature of
state power. I n reality, the state's powers were being expanded to
cover situations where the defendant had extraterritorial contacts
with the state, and it did not matter whether the defendant actually accepted this power. Tracking a development t h a t had been
taking place for a long period of time in prescriptive jurisdiction,l04
t h e state was losing its exclusively territorial dimension.105 No
102 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (emphasis added); see Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (stating that a defendant who establishes a contract u a l relationship with a plaintiff in a forum state purposefully avails himself of the forum
state's laws); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(explaining that personal jurisdiction was not properly asserted over defendants whose product finds itself in the forum state, but who have availed themselves of none of t h e privileges
a n d benefits of the forum state's law); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978)
(holding that a father who allowed his child to spend time with the mother in California had
not purposefully availed himself of California law). Synthesizing all of the post-International
Shoe personal jurisdiction cases to determine the exact extent to which this purposeful
availment formulation has prevailed is complex and beyond the scope of this Article, but
Kevin M. Clermont in his very influential work, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue
L. REV.411 (1981), concluded, "by aggregating the
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL
case law," that jurisdiction "exists over a defendant who h a s purposefully availed himself of
t h e privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." Id. a t 424; see 1 ROBERTC.
IN CML ACTIONS5 2.05 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the importance of
CASAD,JURISDICTION
purposeful availment).
103 In justifying contacts jurisdiction without altering t h e fundamental territorial charact e r of the state, the Supreme Court was faced with a major conceptual dilemma. By definition, a n entity whose jurisdiction is to remain territorially defined cannot assert jurisdiction
extraterritorially. The Court, however, found a solution. The conceptual problem is avoided
to t h e extent t h a t the offshore defendant can be conceived to have independently submitted
to the forum. See Brilmayer, supra note 101, a t 306 (affirming the importance of consent in
the Court's jurisdictional analysis, Brilmayer notes t h a t "[iln keeping with consent as a basis
for assertion of authority, the Court has on numerous occasions emphasized the importance
of t h e defendant's awareness or intent to submit to jurisdiction"). For Brilmayer's more indepth discussion of the political theory supporting consent a s a basis for personal jurisdicJUSTIFYING
INTERNATIONAI,
ACTS(1989).
tion, see generally LEABRILMAYER,
104 Prescriptive jurisdiction is defined by the RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
as the
authority of a state "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order,
OF
by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court." RESTATEMENT
FOREIGN
RELATIONS,
supra note 30, $401(a).
105 The RESTATEMENT
lists four primary bases for prescriptive jurisdiction in addition to
territoriality: "Effects principle" ("jurisdiction with respect to activity outside the state, but
having or intended to have substantial effect within the state's territory"); "Nationality,
domicile, and residence" (jurisdiction to prescribe the activity of a state's own nationals or of
those who are domiciled or residing within it even when they are not within its territorial
boundaries or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction); "protective principle" ("the right of a state
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longer did state jurisdiction (either for states within the United
States or for the nation-states of the world) begin and end with the
state's territorial boundaries.lo6 Contacts jurisdiction meant a redefinition of the powers of both the states within the United States
and of the nation-states of the world, and, as we have seen under
the constitutionally reflected sovereignty paradigm, it is the domain
of the international order t o oversee the allocation of such new
powers among nation-states.lo7
Contacts jurisdiction's nonexclusive, overlapping jurisdictional
realms and the Supreme Court's denial that such jurisdiction involved expanding state powers caused jurisdiction in the contacts
era to appear t o lose its raison d'etre-the
allocation of regulatory
authority. Jurisdiction was not, however, t o be left by courts and
commentators as an empty procedural vessel without an underlying
rationale. And so into the conceptual void (courtesy of the perceived need t o look to the acquiescence of defendants t o rationalize
extraterritorial jurisdiction) came a new jurisdictional missionprotecting the rights of defendants. The Court in Insurance Corp.
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de GuineelOB articulated it
most strongly. That personal jurisdiction can be waived by the deto punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its territory by persons who are not
its nationals [for] offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized a s crimes by developed legal systems"); "passive personality principle" (the right of a state to "apply lawparticularly criminal law-to a n act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national"); "Universal" principle (jurisdiction "to
define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations
a s of universal concern, such as piracy, [or the1 slave trade" even where no other basis of jurisdiction exists). Id. § 402, cmts. c-g, 5 404.
The territorial basis of prescriptive jurisdiction has declined most notably in favor of the
effects doctrine a s a basis for jurisdiction. As nation-states throughout the Post-World War
I1 period have become increasingly interdependent, they are more subject to the effects of
activities that take place on foreign soil. The international legal basis for their attempts to
regulate those offshore activities is the effects doctrine. See generally ROBERTB. REICH,THE
WORKOF NATIONS:PREPARING
OURSELVES
FOR 2 1 ~ ~ - C E N T UCAPITALISM
RY
(1991) (explaining
t h a t territorial boundaries have become increasingly irrelevant in the age of globalized production).
106 In fact, despite Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Schooner Exchange to the contrary, even during the territorial era, absolute territorialism was too confining to fully meet
the regulatory needs of the international order. See RICHARDA. FALK, THE ROLEOF DOMESTIC COURTSIN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGALORDER30 (1964) ("[Als Marshall was ready to
acknowledge and to apply in Schooner Exchange, the fundamental spatial allocation must be
modified to accommodate many situations of interaction between states.").
107 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
personal jurisdiction and the sovereignty paradigm as it is reflected in the U.S. Constitution).
10s 456 U.S.694 (1982).
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fendant,log declared the Court, ''portray[sI it for what it is-a legal
right protecting the indi~idual."~~O
More accurately stated, the convenience of litigating in a particular forum for defendants was the
primary111 (though not only)l12 criterion used to allocate authority
109 The Court also pointed to the fact that the defendant can be estopped from raising the
jurisdictional issue to support its conclusion that persona1 jurisdiction is a legal right protecting the individual. See id. a t 704.
110 Id. While a concern with the rights of defendants has dominated the contacts era jurisdictional discourse and has shaped the contacts era understanding of the jurisdictional
mission, other concerns have also been articulated by the Court as relevant to personal jurisdiction. The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson identified these as follows:
[Tlhe forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations omitted); see
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-16 (1987); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 22324 (1957).
The extent to which these other criteria, sometimes referred to as "sovereignty concerns,"
are important remains unclear in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Patrick J. Borchers,
Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J . COMP.L. 121 (1992). Professor Borchers states:
International Shoe appeared to endorse the position that personal jurisdiction is a
matter of individual entitlement, rather than a mechanism for resolving the competing claims of sovereigns. Over the course of the next forty-six years, however, the
Court revived, [andl dismissed. . . Con several occasions] a 'sovereignty' factor in the
jurisdictional calculus. This uneven conceptualization has made for erratic navigation.
Id. a t 126 (footnotes omitted).
To the extent that these other factors are deemed important, exactly how they combine
with concerns over defendants' rights to create a coherent doctrine is also unclear. The Supreme Court, in Hanson u. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and other decisions, has interpreted
International Shoe's statement that the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with a
forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice," as establishing two separate tests: a minimum contacts test and a
fair play and substantial justice test. See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. a t 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the fair play and substantial justice test). The minimum contacts test
has in various decisions been understood to be the guardian of defendants' rights, while the
fair play and substantial justice test has been regarded as balancing the other relevant concerns with the interests of the defendant. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. a t 113 (discussing the
"several factors" that go into a "determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction"). The Supreme Court, because of a lack of internal consensus, has been unable to
state definitively the relationship between these two tests. For further discussion of these
two tests and the role of "sovereignty" factors, see generally Kevin M. Clermont, supra note
102.
111 See Stein, supra note 95, a t 690.
From 1877 to 1945, inappropriate assertions of jurisdiction were viewed not as mere infringements on a defendant's freedom, but a s violations of the sovereignty of other
states. The last forty years, however, have witnessed an erosion of this political element. Jurisdictional doctrine currently focuses solely on the relationship between the
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for forum courts to hear civil disputes in the contacts era. With the
jurisdictional purpose hidden from view, however, all that remained visible in the jurisdictional exercise was the criterion that
was used for allocating judicial power. It was, therefore, easy for
the primary criterion for allocating such power t o become confused
with the underlying purpose of jurisdiction. Following this substitution, this new "purpose" of jurisdiction came itself t o reinforce the
perception that jurisdiction is unrelated t o the international order's
domain of relations between nations. The focus on defendants, private actors who are subject t o domestic regulation under the paradigm, adds t o the appearance that jurisdiction should fall within
the realm of domestic law.
But by confusing criteria for allocating jurisdiction with the subject matter of jurisdiction, courts and commentators have confused
the fundamental question of when states can assert authority over
private actors with their ability t o assert such authority once they
have jurisdiction. The former, involving the distribution of the
authority among the states to regulate private actors, is a matteras we have seen-for the international order, while the latter, involving the use of that authority once granted t o regulate private
actors, is properly the domain of the domestic order.
3. An Option To Decline Jurisdiction?

Even if one accepts my argument that, under the Constitution,
the international order governs relations between nation-states,
and that international jurisdiction, including contacts jurisdiction,
is about allocating authority between nation-states, we are not yet
finished. Does not the Constitution, operating in accordance with
the sovereignty paradigm, preserve the ability for the United States
t o decline t o exercise its international grant of jurisdiction? This is
a crucial question because the most likely potential for perceived
conflict between the Constitution and a jurisdictional treaty would
be if jurisdiction over certain cases were t o be mandatorily assigned
t o the United States, and acceptance of that assignment was seen

defendant and the forum, and the legitimacy of the forum's assertion of jurisdiction depends exclusively on fairness to the defendant.
Id. (footnote omitted).
112 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (identifying criteria, other than protecting
defendants' rights, which are considered relevant to determinations of personal jurisdiction).
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t o be inconsistent with the defendant's constitutional rights under
the minimum contacts test.113
There is no doubt that allowing for nation-states t o decline t o exercise their grant of jurisdiction would be consistent with a certain
jurisdictional scheme. Under such an approach, the international
order would coordinate the distribution of regulatory authority by
defining when assertions of jurisdiction would be allowed without
requiring nation-states t o engage in such assertions. This semiflexible system will be recognized as the personal jurisdictional
scheme that has been adopted domestically for use among the
states of the United States.114
Another quite valid jurisdictional scheme, however, would mandatorily assign jurisdictional responsibilities t o nation-states. To
the extent this approach is adopted in an international treaty, the
constitutionalized convenience-of-defendants criterion for allocating
jurisdiction among the states of the United States should not be interpreted as encroaching on the domain of the treaty. Any confusion in this regard is just another variation on the basic confusion
about what is appropriately domestic, and what is international, in
the age of contacts jurisdiction. The constitutionalized convenienceof-defendants criterion's sole purpose is to determine jurisdiction. If
the Framers of the Constitution did not intend for the document t o
govern international jurisdiction, then they likewise did not intend
for its criteria for granting jurisdiction t o be applied internationally. That such criteria may be deemed to be very important-even
fundamental-is not the same as to say it insinuates itself into the
international realm.
In sharp distinction are situations that are established t o be
within the Constitution's domain and where the constitutional prescriptions run counter t o those of the international order. An example would be a United States prosecution for an act of hate
speech that transpired in such a way as t o be clearly within the
realm of the Constitution's domain. This would lay the basis for a
conflict between the First Amendment's guarantee of free speechl15

For a discussion of what these might be, see Borchers, supra note 6, a t 1164-73.
See supra Part 1.B (discussing the American approach to personal jurisdiction).
115 U.S. CONST.amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."); see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (upholding the
constitutional right to engage in cross burning as an act of hate speech); National Socialist
113

114
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and international law's arguable ban on hate speech.116 Under the
American dualist approach t o the relationship between domestic
and international law, the constitutional standards would prevail
in U.S. Courts.117 AS we have seen, however, international jurisdiction by the Constitution's own terms is not within its domain.
Hence, no conflict would present itself between the domestic criteria used to allocate jurisdiction and the international criteria used
t o do the same.
4. Good Constitutional Law Makes Good Policy
Logical perhaps, but from a policy point of view are we really to
deny "basic" constitutional protections t o defendants in international cases? Again, a clear understanding of jurisdiction in light of
the sovereignty paradigm makes the policy arguments for allowing
an international treaty t o govern international jurisdiction as compelling as are the constitutional arguments. The constitutional arguments are themselves, after all, driven by an attempt t o allocate
power coherently between the domestic and international orders.
In beginning this discussion, we should keep in mind that the
Supreme Court's celebration of the convenience-of-defendantscriterion as the dominant constitutional factor in jurisdictional analysis
was not inevitable. No doubt it is a very important criterion for determining which state should have jurisdiction. Other criteria,
however, exist as well,ll8 and the equation between defendants being forced t o litigate in an inconvenient forum and fundamental
human rights violations is, as we have seen, a peculiar function of

Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (upholding the constitutional right
to engage in public marching a s a n act of hate speech).
116 See generally Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of
Radio Jamming, 9 1 AM. J . INT'LL. 628, 640 (1997) (discussing provisions in international
human rights instruments qualifying freedom of expression in the interest of what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights terms "due recognition and respect for t h e rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare") (footnote omitted).
The United States adhered to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
subject to a reservation t h a t the Covenant "does not authorize or require legislation or other
action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." S. EXEC.REP. NO. 102-23, a t 22
(1992).
117 See supra P a r t 1.A (discussing the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over international law in U.S. courts).
118 See supra note 110 (identifying other criteria relevant to determining jurisdiction).
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the need for territorial states t o justify jurisdiction outside of their
territories. llg
More specifically, what interests would be advanced by giving
primacy t o the U.S. Constitution in case of conflict with a jurisdiction treaty? Insisting on the applicability of U.S. constitutional
principles would most likely protect non-American defendants
whose cases would be assigned to the United States under the
treaty, but who, under the American minimum contacts test, would
not be subject t o U.S. jurisdiction.120 Presumably these foreign citizens' own governments (in addition to our own) would have agreed
t o the treaty. Any country that felt that the treaty did not adequately protect its citizens could decline to become a party. Would
it really make sense for the United States to breach its obligations
t o foreign countries and incur their wrath in the name of protecting
such countries7own citizens?121
Of course the United States should extend fundamental human
rights protections t o citizens regardless of the states from which
they come, o r for that matter, regardless of any treaty to the contrary.122 Realistically, however, a jurisdiction treaty would be extremely unlikely to have onerous provisions which would violate, in
119 See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (discussing emphasis on defendants
rights as a response to the need to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction).
120 A situation where the treaty required the United States to take jurisdiction over an
American citizen that it otherwise would not have under U.S. constitutional principles would
be very unlikely to emerge. This is for the simple reason that the U.S. Constitution provides
for the United States to assert jurisdiction over its own citizens. See Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (holding that nationality or citizenship provides a basis for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction). That states have the power to assert personal jurisdiction over their own domiciliaries goes back to the holding in Pennoyer u. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
734 (1877). See also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (holding that an individual
is subject to personal jurisdiction in a state where he or she is domiciled).
121 The policy arguments against the United States refusing a direct assignment of jurisdiction are even stronger if one considers the probable results of such a refusal. Quite likely,
there would be no forum to hear the dispute since other treaty parties would not want to
countenance an American violation of the treaty with a violation of their own. The resulting
situation would be worse than if the treaty provision did not exist in the first place, and
could probably only be resolved through diplomacy, which could become rather contentious.
122 In fact, international law under the principle of jus cogens most likely requires states
not to give force to a treaty in violation of fundamental human rights. This principle holds
that some norms of international law are superior in status and cannot be affected by a
treaty. Most commentators believe that the protection of fundamental human rights is
among these norms. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87
AM. J. INT'LL. 529 (1993) (explaining how and why fundamental human rights principles
have taken on the status of jus cogens). For the codification of the principle of jus cogens, see
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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any real sense, the fundamental human rights of defendants.
Rather, t o the extent of inconsistency with our own Constitution,
the treaty parties (including the United States if it signs the treaty)
would simply have weighed the criteria for determining which forum should hear a dispute slightly differently than have our own
courts in constitutionalizing the minimum contacts test. All state
parties t o the treaty, after all, have the same basic interest in creating an international judicial system that will allow civil disputes
t o be resolved effectively and judgments t o be satisfied. Given the
strong constitutional and policy reasons for deferring what is properly international t o the international realm, only a certain xenophobia can weigh for insisting on insinuating our own domestic
principles into a realm where they do not belong.

The negotiation and successful implementation of a Hague Convention on jurisdiction and satisfaction of judgments would be a
very positive international development. It would not only help
improve the functioning of the international judicial system, but
would also help further the grander aim of creating a more coherent
international order. If the international community were successfully to conclude such a jurisdiction treaty, and the United States
were to accede to it, how unfortunate it would be if doctrinal confusion were to stand in the way of its successful implementation.
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution understood where America
ends and the international order begins. It is now more important
than ever that our courts correctly apply this understanding to present-day jurisdictional circumstances. Otherwise, they risk sabotaging globally cooperative efforts to construct an international judicial system which can meet the demands of the twenty-first
century global economy.

